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INTRODUCTION 
Organisations respond to intensive labour needs in several ways; departmentalising, creating corporate 
groups with key companies having few employees, engaging contractors, and outsourcing. These 
strategies can be used to transfer the obligations typically associated with employee liabilities1  through 
a decentralised structure that distances the business management from front line operations.  Checks 
and balances for related companies are governed by corporate law. Contractors negotiate and sign 
supplier agreements that address the risks of all parties, including the risk of any of the parties’ 
businesses failing. Business format franchising (‘franchising’) is a form of outsourcing. In franchising, 
erstwhile employers of large labour forces become franchisors and outsource branch ownership, 
management, equity and debt financing, insurance, responsibility for employees, and associated 
obligations to franchisees.  This is achieved through standard form contracts presented to franchisees 
on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. As Taylor noted as early as 1997, ‘Franchising is another country … 
While the form is contractual, the franchise retains many of the features of the firm.’2   But, through 
this form of outsourcing, corporate law obligations and scrutiny are avoided.3 
Given the discrepancies between employment and franchising, our discussion draws on 
concepts from institutional theory. Institutionalisation refers to the process whereby certain processes, 
such as the mechanisms and flexibility of the franchise model, take on a rule-like status.4 In the franchise 
model, institutional rules developed over time no longer reflect the reality of a mature franchise market. 
They are nonetheless embedded in the model. This suits franchisors well. Gillian Hadfield observed 
                                                     
1 Sir Brian Langstaff, ‘Changing Times, Changing Relationships at Work…Changing Law?’ (2016) 45(2) Industrial Law Journal 131. 
2 Veronica L Taylor, ‘Contracts with the Lot: Franchises, Good Faith and Contract Regulation’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 459, 460. 
3 Franchising in Australia broke free of corporations’ law oversight after a Western Australian franchisee had won the right to be provided 
with a prospectus that complied with the then Companies Act 1981 finding that a franchise fell within the definition of ‘prescribed interest’ 
Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Casnot Pty Ltd (1981) CLC 40-704 (‘Casnot’). The regulatory response was to exempt franchisors. See 
Michael T Schaper and Jenny Buchan ‘Franchising in Australia: A History’ International Journal of Franchising Law (2014) 12(4) 3, 9 for 
fuller details.  
4 John W Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalised Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’ (1977) 83(2) American Journal 
of Sociology 340, 341. 
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that: ‘Unlike … an employment relation … the franchise relationship is characterised by the fact that 
franchisees own the bulk of capital assets of the franchise and franchisors retain the right to determine 
how franchisees will use those assets.’5 Early franchising comprised a straightforward, albeit skewed, 
contractual relationship between a franchisor and each of its franchisees. Possibly because early 
franchisors were assumed to have tested the business thoroughly before offering franchises, the 
contracts did not provide for the franchisor becoming insolvent. As the system matures the franchisor 
spreads its roles through numerous franchisor-related companies. When the franchisor expands 
internationally, sells its role to public shareholders or private investors, or takes any risky strategic 
decision like borrowing to acquire an additional brand, the original franchisor/franchisee relationship is 
placed at risk. For franchisors, the essential driver of franchisee profitability can quickly give way to 
shareholder or venture capitalist focus on growth of dividends and reduction of costs. Franchisor failure 
may be the outcome.  
Employees regularly benefit from legislative and social protections that can include 
participation, consultation, requirement for fair treatment, and alternative employment or pay-outs when 
their jobs are at risk.  Corporations law recognises employees as priority creditors in their employer’s 
insolvency. But, there is no specific provision, anywhere in the world, to accommodate franchisees 
interest as their franchisor fails. We suggest the resistance to recasting franchising as a form of business 
requiring adjustment to insolvency rules can be explained by the theories of path dependency, and moral 
hazard and to franchisees’ own optimism bias. 
Path dependence, ‘paths shaped by a nation’s political and cultural institutions or chaotic 
chance events’6 helps explain how the rejection of the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Casnot 
Pty Ltd (1981) CLC 40-704 interpretation in Australia7 led to franchising being regulated solely under 
                                                     
5 Gillian K Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1999) 42 Stanford Law Review 927, 991. 
6 Mark J Roe ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’ Harvard Law Review (1996) 109(3) 641, 646-647. Roe provides an analogy to 
explain the profound effect of path dependency: describing the winding walking path that detoured to avoid a wolves’ den, eventually 
becoming a winding road that led to cars being designed to deal with high speed cornering capacity. A better solution would have been to 
build a straight road as people in modern vehicles do not risk being attacked by wolves. 
7 Penny Ward ‘Legal and Legislative Directions Relating to Franchising’ in B. Bell, ed, Franchising Down Under in the Lands of Oz and of 
the Long White Cloud: An Historical, Educative and Biographic Review 1983 – 2003 of Franchising in Australia and New Zealand  (2003, 
Wilberforce, NSW) 187 – 192. ‘The Western Australian Supreme Court held in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Casnot Pty Ltd (1981) 
CLC 40-704 that a franchise needed to provide franchisees with a prospectus because the offering fell within the description of a ‘prescribed 
interest’ form of securities in the-then Companies Act 1981. Following the Casnot decision the (then) corporate regulator, the National 
Companies and Securities Commission, recognized that the franchise relationship of the early 1980s differed from the relationship between 
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the national competition and consumer law, rather than corporations law. This shifted the regulation 
from the possibility of regulation via the ‘cradle to grave’ approach of the Corporations Act to 
franchising being regulated solely under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 that governs 
competition and consumer protection. The latter has no role in business failure.   It also helps us 
understand the difficulty of introducing change in regulatory frameworks. The franchise model, as a 
relative newcomer to business has evolved under the radar of many legislatures, and often without 
regulatory constraint.8 Franchisors naturally resist regulation that would inhibit the adaptable character 
of franchising. They cling to the mantra of growth and success. Such institutional behaviour shows a 
path dependent tendency by placing importance on the status quo of flexibility of the basic 
franchisor/franchisee relationship remaining in a low regulatory environment. As the model has 
matured, it is arguable that franchisors also take advantage of franchisee optimism bias, treating 
franchisees like tools of investment and financial gain, even to the point of delaying inevitable 
insolvency through capital injection by way of franchise fees. Although franchising has often been 
likened to a marriage, or a ‘partnership’ these analogies fail when franchise relationships are viewed 
through a legal lens. They fail spectacularly when we consider that the law provides rules governing 
the failure of a marriage9 or a partnership,10 but not the failure of a franchisor. Conversely, Australia’s 
franchise law does provide for the failure of a franchisee.11 ‘Much of the content of franchising 
agreements and the supporting ideology seems reminiscent of feudal contractual relationships.’12 
Today, the franchise relationship remains one of subordination of franchisees, who are more akin to 
employees who have bought their job, than independent contractors. While academics have identified 
that moral hazard can exist on the franchisor’s side,13 none have examined the moral hazard that exists 
                                                     
offerors of most prescribed interests and investors in important respects. As a result, it exempted franchisors from the requirement to enter 
into a trust deed, appoint a trustee and register a statement of their “securities” offering. However, they were required to apply for the exemption 
and were required to include prescribed provisions in their franchise agreement, provide a prior disclosure document to franchisees and obtain 
a securities dealer's licence. This regime was repealed by an amendment in 1987.’ 
8 By 2016, 39 of the 195 countries in the world had enacted specific franchise laws 
ttps://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_images/DLAINTLFRANLAWS2016.JPG 
9 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
10 Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) Division 4. 
11 Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulation 2014, Clause 29 (1) (b) 
12 Veronica L Taylor, ‘Contracts with the Lot: Franchises, Good Faith and Contract Regulation’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 459, 467. 
13 Francine Lafontaine, ‘Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results’ (1992) 21 RAND Journal of Economics 263; Kabir C Sen, 
‘The Use of Initial Fees and Royalties in Business-Format Franchising’ (1993) 14 Managerial and Decision Economics 175; Frank A Scott 
Jr, ‘Franchising vs. Company Ownership as a Decision Variable of the Firm’ (1995) 10 Review of Industrial Organization 69. 
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during franchisor failure. We base our arguments for the implementation of participative procedures 
and genuine stakeholder rights for franchisees in this area of moral hazard.  
When a non-franchised company experiences financial difficulty, employees become a 
significant burden for administrators, and subsequently for liquidators, but the opposite applies when a 
franchisor is failing: franchisees become an unpaid labour force during the franchisor’s administration. 
Administrators may discover that franchise agreements, binding while the administrator tries to sell the 
franchise, are their most valuable assets.  Ultimately, franchise agreements are disclaimed as onerous 
contracts by liquidators if no buyer is found, leaving franchisees without the support of their franchisor, 
and potentially losing their businesses. This is the franchisors’ insurance-like pay-out for the franchisees 
accepting moral risk.   
With significant assets at risk for franchisees, the level of risk transference in the franchise 
model represents a moral hazard which occurs when franchisors increase their exposure to risk when 
‘insured’. The insurers are franchisees who bear the cost/provide ‘insurance’ for the franchisor’s risky 
decisions. There is no disincentive to risk-shifting by franchisors. While franchisees can choose which 
brand to invest in: McDonald’s, Hungry Jack’s or Burger King; Hilton Hotels or Quest Serviced 
Apartments; Flight Centre, Harvey World Travel, itravel or the now insolvent Traveland; once the 
franchise relationship is established, franchisees lose independence.  Their absence of independence is 
particularly evident when a franchisor fails.  
While the franchise model has had a comparatively short existence, it continues to be used 
globally and, as previously noted, usually without specific regulatory constraint. Where regulations do 
exist they make provision for, variously, registration, pre-commitment disclosure, mandatory terms 
and/or dispute resolution processes. Some address franchisee insolvency/bankruptcy through 
mandatory terms14 but none address franchisor failure. There is a clear resistance to imposing 
enforceable regulation that would inhibit the innovative character of franchising. This behaviour shows 
                                                     
14 For problems newly created by Australia’s Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Act 2017 see Rob Nicholls and 
Jenny Buchan ‘The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Effects of Voiding Ipso Facto Clauses in Business Format Franchise Agreements’ 
(2017) 45 Australian Business Law Review 433, 444-446. 
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a path dependent15 tendency by placing importance on the status quo of flexibility in a low regulatory 
environment over time, while ignoring the level of sophistication of 21st century franchise networks. It 
is difficult to implement change that would interfere with that status quo.  
The franchise model also takes advantage of franchisee optimism bias, treating franchisees like 
tools of costless investment finance, and financial gain. Fees generated through sales of new franchises 
sometimes provide capital injections during times of financial distress of which franchisees will be 
unaware.16 Today, the franchise relationship tends toward subordination of franchisees, much like the 
position of employees. It is in this area of moral hazard in the use of the franchise model that our 
arguments for the implementation of participative and consultative procedures is derived. It is timely 
that we break the institutional path protecting the flexibility of the franchise model to acknowledge the 
moral hazard present in the model and introduce changes to mitigate the risks to which franchisees are 
all exposed. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the legal position of franchisees during franchisor 
insolvency17 through the lens of moral hazard with a view to proposing solutions derived from existing 
employment regulation. There are many similarities between employees and franchisees, including the 
asymmetry of information available about the overall financial health of the employer/franchisor. While 
long recognised that these issues can be acute in employment relationships, we argue that franchisees 
are currently more vulnerable. A compounding factor is the aspect of optimism bias. This tendency of 
individuals to underestimate risks is strongly present in franchisees.18   
We arrive at recommendations to resolve the moral hazard borne by franchisees by comparing 
the legal position of employees in collective redundancy arrangements with that of franchisees of 
insolvent franchisors in three jurisdictions: the United States (US), Australia, and the United Kingdom 
(UK).  As Australia has a uniform national regulatory framework for franchises, greater space is given 
                                                     
15 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
16 Jenny Buchan, Lorelle Frazer, Charles Z Qu and Rob Nicholls, ‘Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles, Factors and Impacts’ (2015) 
22(4) Journal of Marketing Channels, 311, 323. 
17 The terms insolvency is used in Australia and the UK for the failure of a corporation. The term bankruptcy is used in the USA. 
18 Uri Benoliel, Jenny Buchan, & Tony Gutentag, ‘Revisiting the Rationality Assumption of Disclosure Laws: an Empirical Analysis (2016) 
46(2) Hofstra Law Review 469. 
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to the Australian franchise environment. In our analysis, we ask whether franchisees should benefit 
from greater participation during their franchisor’s administration and insolvency, introducing greater 
equity and diminishing the morally hazardous advantage-taking that the business model currently 
offers. We then argue for better recognition of the asymmetries and risks affecting franchisees and 
suggest how franchise laws could adopt solutions from employment law.  
FRANCHISEES AND EMPLOYEES IN CONTEXT 
Franchising has been a part of the socio-economic landscape of western economies for decades. Now, 
almost every corner of the global retail economy has franchising. In the US, Howard Johnson began 
franchising restaurants in 1935 and Sanders selling chicken in the 1950s,19 while the McDonald brothers 
started selling burgers in 1937.20 In Australia, each of the 1100 business format franchisors has an 
average of 60 franchisees; some have hundreds, and some only one. As employers, Australian 
franchisors and franchisees together provide employment for approximately 472,000 employees.21  
In franchising, a franchisor develops a branded retail business, commits its day-to-day operation 
to manuals, and grants licences to franchisees to replicate the business using the franchisor’s brands and 
systems.  Franchisees themselves have many different starting points. Some are like Aziz Hashim, 
former Chair of the International Franchise Association who recalls his inexperience as a first-time 
franchisee, buying a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) outlet in Atlanta prior to the 1996 Atlanta Olympic 
Games. Regarding metrics such as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA) or Rate of Return, he admits: ‘I was clueless! I was just happy that KFC gave me a 
franchise..’22 Others are like an Australian franchisee whose starting point was to spend her student 
years as a franchisor’s employee before becoming a multi-unit owner. As a franchisee, she saw a very 
different face of the brand, writing  
                                                     
19 Alexander M Meiklejohn (ed.), Franchising: Cases, Materials and Problems (American Bar Association 2013) 9. 
20 John F Love, McDonald’s Behind the Arches (Bantam Books 1986) 12. 
21 Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven, Anthony Grace, & Selva Selvanathan, ‘Franchising Australia 2016’ (Griffith University, 2016). 
22 Don Sniegowski, ‘Interview with Aziz Hashim, former Chairman of the International Franchise Association’ (Blue Maumau, 28 June 2016) 
<http://www.bluemaumau.org/15230/ifa_chairman_aziz_hashim_says_franchise_profits_rate_return_are_key#comments> accessed 1 March 
2018. 
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Not until I got down on the ground floor did I start to really see the bullying and 
deceit of the franchisor and their often deliberate demise of some franchisees. 
Typically the ones who had a voice until it was silenced in fear.23 
Franchise relationships are documented in contracts. Gillian Hadfield observes that 
‘Franchising is problematic for contract law.’24 For her,  
the heart of the problem [is] the incompleteness of the contracts that structure such a 
complex relationship, one which requires high levels of commitment to protect 
[often] large sunk investments against opportunism.’25  
 
The potential for opportunism arises because franchisors and franchisees commit to their relationships 
by signing standard form executory contracts. These are drafted by franchisors to reflect their interests, 
mitigate their risks, and maintain consistency throughout the franchise system. They place numerous 
controls and obligations on franchisees while expressing limited franchisors’ obligations, often in 
discretionary terms. The non-negotiable nature of the contract is symptomatic of the pervasive 
asymmetry that permeates franchise relationships.26  
As Hadfield observes of franchising, ‘such an odd-shaped beast tangles in many areas of the 
law.’27 Through the process of navigating the tangles franchise law has now evolved as a discrete legal 
discipline. In jurisdictions that have introduced franchise-specific laws the need to protect franchisees 
from exploitation was acknowledged. For example, a professed objective when Australia’s original 
mandatory Franchising Code of Conduct was enacted in 1998 was to ‘address the imbalance of power’28 
between the parties prior to and/or during the term of the franchise agreement. This has now been 
reoriented as regulation ‘to regulate the conduct of participants in franchising towards other participants 
in franchising’.29 The asymmetry of power continues into the political sphere. The franchisor voice 
often has the greater influence on legislation. For example, Division 3 of Australia’s Franchising Code 
                                                     
23 Submission 199 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Operation and Effectiveness of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, 2018.  
24 Gillian K Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 927, 929. 
25 Gillian K Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 927, 929. 
26 Jenny Buchan, ‘Ex ante Information and ex post Reality for Franchisees: the Case of Franchisor Failure’ (2008) 36(6) Australian Business 
Law Review 407. 
27 Gillian K Hadfield ibid, 928. 
28 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, SELECT LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENT NO. 168, 2014, Issued by the authority of the Minister for 
Small Business, Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulation 2014, 2.2.  
29 Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulation 2014. Clause 2. 
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of Conduct imposes a duty on the parties to act in good faith. But, this does not extend to the franchisor’s 
parent entity. While some consumer protection laws have acknowledged franchising, insolvency law 
has yet to adapt the business model. 
The American Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Rule is national regulation, supplemented in 
24 states30 by additional regulation.31  Australia’s franchise sector is regulated by the Competition and 
Consumer (Industry Codes – Franchising) Regulations 2014.  The UK relies on general commercial 
law to regulate franchising.  Where specific legislation does exist for franchise relationships, it focusses 
variously on pre-contract disclosure, cooling off rights, registration of disclosure and franchise 
agreements or agents, implying terms into agreements, and dispute resolution methods. The risk to 
franchisors of franchisee insolvency has been addressed in some franchise regulations that identify 
franchisee insolvency as an event triggering the franchisor’s right to ‘terminate without notice’.  
Franchise agreements provide the same rights. No regulatory, and little academic attention has been 
paid to the possibility of franchisees’ rights in franchisor’s insolvency.  
The franchisor’s role includes formulating network policy, making strategic decisions, 
managing the network and negotiating supplier agreements. The franchisees’ role is to create a business 
following the franchisor’s blueprint and adhere to the terms of the franchise agreement and any system-
changes introduced periodically through amendments to operations manuals or, in the case of significant 
amendments, new franchise agreements. Beyond a requirement of good faith in some jurisdictions, 
franchisors are not required to justify any strategic or operational decisions to their franchisees. 
A key distinction between a relationship categorised as employment or as a franchise is that 
where the employer is a corporation, the conduct of its directors and officers towards employees is 
measured against standards in corporate law. For franchisors, this additional layer of governance 
regulation is absent. Franchising is a contract-based relationship. In Australia, even the statutory duty 
                                                     
30 Arkansas. Code Ann. ss4-72-201; California Corp. Code s31005; Hawaii Rev. Stat. s482E-2; Connecticut Gen. Stat. s42-133e; 6 Delaware 
Code Ann. ss2551; Florida Stat. ss817.416; Illinois 815 ILCS 705/1; Indiana Code s23-2-2.5-1; Iowa Code ss523H.1, 537A.10; Maryland 
Code Ann.s14-201; Michigan MCLS s445.1501; Minnesota Stat. § 80C.01; Mississippi Code Ann. s75-24-51; Missouri Rev. Stat. ss407.400; 
Nebraska Rev. Stat. ss87-401; New Jersey Stat. Ann. ss56:10-1; New York Gen. Bus. Laws s681(3); North Dakota Cent. Code s ss51-19-01; 
Oregon Rev. Stat. s650.005(4); Rhode Island Gen. Laws s19-28- 3(c); South Dakota Codified Laws s37-5B-1; Virginia Code Ann. s13.1-
559(b); Washington Rev. Code s19.100.010(4); Wisconsin Stat. s553.03(4); see Babette Märzheuser-Wood and Brian Baggott, ‘Franchise 
Law in the United States’ (Dentons 2015) <https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2015/june/12/franchise-law-in-the-united-states>. 
31 Alexander M Meiklejohn (ed.), Franchising: Cases, Materials and Problems (American Bar Association 2013) Chapter 9.  
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of good faith is diluted by Clause 6 (6) of the Franchising Code (Code) which provides: ‘To avoid 
doubt, the obligation to act in good faith does not prevent a party to a franchise agreement, or a person 
who proposes to become such a party, from acting in his, her or its legitimate commercial interests.’ 
Thus, there is no requirement for a franchisor to consider the impact of strategic decisions on its 
franchisees if this would be contrary to its legitimate commercial interests. 
In the US, ‘[c]orporate lawyers have managed to draft contracts to eliminate the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in franchise agreements. They have also lobbied in every state 
to eliminate the fiduciary duty that franchisors should owe to their franchisees.’32 However, cases are 
fact fact-specific and there remains some state legislation.33 Similarly, in Australia, it has been argued 
that franchisors owe no fiduciary duty to their franchisees.34  A franchisor’s relationship with 
franchisees attracts no scrutiny under corporate law. This becomes a significant issue in insolvency. 
There are some common features. Both employees and franchisees are usually protected by 
legislation prohibiting misleading or deceptive hiring practices. Employees often have additional 
protections associated with an employer’s insolvency, including a statutory priority for pay 
entitlements;35 national safety net insurance funds;36 employment protection during business transfers;37 
information and consultation obligations for companies undergoing large scale redundancies or lay-
                                                     
32 Stanley Turkel, ‘Are Franchisees Agents of Franchisors?’ (Blue Maumau 13 August 2013) 
<http://www.bluemaumau.org/are_franchisees_agents_franchisors>; American law is split as to whether a fiduciary relationship exists 
between a franchisor and franchisee but most sources deny the existence of this relationship. However, cases are fact-specific and there is 
some state legislation. See Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ (2004-2005) 109(1) 
Penn State Law Review 105, and Meiklejohn (n 16) 664-7, 704-6, 726-7. 
33 Alexander M Meiklejohn (ed.), Franchising: Cases, Materials and Problems (American Bar Association 2013) 726-727. 
34 See for example the Australian view in Jax Franchising Systems Pty Limited v State Rail Authority (New South Wales); Jax Tyres Pty 
Limited v State Rail Authority (New South Wales) [2003] NSWLEC 397; Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd [2005] 
FCAFC 131 (Branson, Nicholson and Jacobson JJ). The possibility of the McDonald’s owing a fiduciary duty was pleaded by the franchisee 
but not argued in Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald's Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310. In Diab Pty Ltd v YUM! Restaurants Australia Pty Ltd 
[2016] FCA 43, a case about good faith and unconscionable conduct, the parties agreed that ‘The Franchisee  is an independent contractor and 
no  fiduciary  relationship exists between the franchisor and the  Franchisee’. In Germany, however ‘During the initial phase, when a franchisor 
starts to explain its franchise opportunity, and during contract negotiations a pre-contractual relationship with fiduciary duties emerges which 
obliges the parities to disclose whatever information is essential for their future relationship’. 
35 See for example the UK Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule 6, Category 5: Remuneration, etc., of employees; Australian Corporations Act 
2001, s556; and s507(a)(4) of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
36 See for example EU Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
the protection of employees in the event of their employer’s insolvency [1980] L 283, 28/10/1980 P. 0023 - 0027, as implemented among the 
Member States of the EU and the Australian Air Passenger Ticket Levy (Collection) Act 2001 enacted following Ansett’s failure to fund the 
government lifeline for its employees pay entitlements. The franchisees had to collect the levy as they watched takings slow in their own 
businesses. 
37 See for example Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L 82, 
22.3.2001, p. 16–20 and the Australian Fair Work Act 2009 Part 2-8.  
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offs, redundancy pay;38 and sometimes, government life-lines.39 No such life-lines or protections exist 
for franchisees. 
Despite the absence of empirical evidence, franchising benefits from the mantra that the business 
model is more successful than independent small business. Many franchisors start franchising before 
the franchise businesses are sufficiently established as proven successes. In Australia 42 percent of 
brands began franchising immediately, or within the ﬁrst year of operation.40 The evidence does show 
that both new and long-established franchisors can fail.41  
Franchisee Risks in a Failing Franchise 
Employment relationships have long been recognised as having an inherent imbalance owing to the 
power an employer has in the provision of terms, wages, and work to employees. Like employees, 
franchisees are beset by asymmetries of information, bargaining power, contractual negotiation, 
process, experience of adviser, premises, finance, and regulation. It is in the asymmetries of information 
that the forces of the competitive marketplace are particularly disrupted, rendering it unequal as between 
franchisees and franchisors. A perfectly competitive market must not have asymmetries of information, 
else market equilibrium will be disrupted in favour of the party with greater information, normally the 
franchisor in this case. While true that the franchise agreement is predicated on an assumption of some 
basic informational asymmetries, such as local demand and site of the premises,42 this does not negate 
the fundamental economic requirements of a perfectly competitive marketplace requiring no regulation 
to ensure fairness.  When faced with a franchisor’s insolvency, the need for information upon which to 
base decisions that could save a franchisee’s financial security are more acute. These asymmetries are 
                                                     
38 See for example the United States Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act) 102 Stat. 890, Public Law 100-
379 of the 100th Congress, Aug. 4, 1988; the Australian Fair Work Act 2009; and in the EU, pursuant to the Collective Redundancies Directive: 
Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] 
OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p. 16–21, as implemented in each Member State. 
39 Ansett Airlines had 15000 employees when it failed in 2002. 4,500 were represented by the Ansett Services union (ASU). The administrators 
of Ansett negotiated a Federal Government scheme (SEESA – Special Employment Entitlements Scheme for Ansett) under which some 
employee entitlements could be advanced. The scheme advanced $382.4 million to Ansett and by 21 September 2011 $363 million had been 
reimbursed. See Korda Mentha, media release ‘Ansett administration makes final landing with 96 cents in the $ for employees’ 2 September 
2011. Similarly, the Federal Government injected up to $22 million as a partial bail-out to keep ABC Learning child care centres open until a 
buyer was found.  
40 Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven, Anthony Grace, & Selva Selvanathan, ‘Franchising Australia 2016’ (Griffith University 2016) 20. 
41 Jenny Buchan, ‘Franchisor Failure: An Assessment of the Adequacy of Regulatory Response’ (PhD Dissertation, Queensland University of 
Technology, 2010) 42. For example, Angus and Robertson failed as a franchisor after over 100 years of being an Australian bookseller. 
42 G Frank Mathewson and Ralph A Winter, ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’, (1985) 28(3) Journal of Law and Economics 503, 507.  
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not a part of the accepted assumptions of the franchise business model. Thus, decisions made by 
franchisees who are beset by information asymmetries of this nature may not be made in a truly utility 
or profit-maximising way,43 leading to a failure in the competitive franchise market insofar as it should 
benefit a franchisee’s business decisions. Such market failure will often indicate the need for some form 
of regulation in order to mitigate the imbalance in competition.44  The recommendations at the end of 
this article attempt to provide a potential mitigative regulatory framework for this imbalance.   
Through franchise agreements franchisees take on significant risks that an employer lacking 
the opportunity to outsource to franchisees would otherwise bear. These include intangibles, such as 
market and location risk, as well as concrete costs, like fitting out the business premises, paying for 
insurance and advertising, carrying stock, hiring employees, accommodating leave entitlements, paying 
payroll tax and superannuation. Their franchisor’s insolvency will often catch franchisees unawares. 
Having bought into a ‘proven’ system, neither they nor their transactional advisors normally consider 
the consequences of the franchisor’s demise. Naivete to the risk of franchisor failure is made more acute 
by optimism bias and because franchisees are excluded from a role in the franchisor’s insolvency 
process.  As such, franchisee risk persists due to the lack of appropriate regulation.45  
Strategic decision-making input into the franchisor’s business is beyond the role of franchisees. 
For example, the franchised Sizzler restaurants in Australia were reduced to non-core businesses by 
parent company Collins Foods to enable Collins to focus on growing its KFC outlets. Consequently, 
Sizzler was not allocated any growth capital in 2016 following a $37.5 million write down of the 
brand.46 This marginalising of franchisees from input into the franchisor’s strategic decisions is also 
recognised by Hashim, who observed that unless a franchisee becomes a shareholder, they have no 
scope for participation in franchisor decision-making.47  
                                                     
43 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, ‘Law & Economics’ (6th edn, Pearson 2012) 38-41.  
44 Richard A Posner, ‘Theories of Market Regulation’ (1974) 5(2) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 335. 
45 Jenny Buchan, ‘Ex ante Information and ex post Reality for Franchisees: the Case of Franchisor Failure’ (2008) 36(6) Australian Business 
Law Review 407. 
46 Jason Gherke, ‘Sizzler on Life Support as Stores Shut’ (Franchise Advisory Centre newsletter) 
<http://www.news.com.au/finance/business/retail/sizzler-on-life-support-as-stores-shut/news-story/754dfaa661aa32479cbe2396dcd9909c> 
accessed 26 March 2018.  
47 Don Sniegowski, ‘Interview with Aziz Hashim, former Chairman of the International Franchise Association’ (Blue Maumau, 28 June 2016) 
<http://www.bluemaumau.org/15230/ifa_chairman_aziz_hashim_says_franchise_profits_rate_return_are_key#comments> accessed 1 March 
2018. 
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Franchisees in Australia are warned ex ante that a franchisor or franchisee could fail in a range 
of ways. Both regulator-funded pre-franchise education and Code-mandated pre-contract disclosures 
warn that some franchisors and franchisees fail. Franchisees are informed that franchises have a lower 
failure rate than other businesses but acknowledge that franchising is not risk free and that insolvency 
could be one of those risks, which ‘…may have significant impacts on your business, for instance, you 
may no longer be able to use the franchise system’s branding.’48  There is no empirical support for this 
assertion of a lower failure rate. 
Inability to use the franchisor’s branding will be the least of a franchisee’s worries. An 
administrator owes statutory duties to the franchisors’ creditors, including its employees. If the 
franchisor is head tenant and the franchisee is a sub-tenant of the franchisees’ premises, entering 
administration is a breach of the head lease. The landlord can then terminate the head lease, leaving the 
sub-tenant franchisee without premises. The same is true for intellectual property assets that may be 
sold by an administrator to secure distributions to creditors. If these are sold to a competitor, the 
franchisees can no longer use them.  This would destroy the brand value of the franchised business.  
The Franchise Council of Australia (FCA) warns, down-playing the consequences of franchisor 
failure, that one should not engage in self-employment or franchising if one is not prepared to risk losing 
the investment made. ‘There are no guarantees of success in any form of small business, and even 
though franchising is by far the most successful form of small business, it is still a business venture 
with the many of the same risks inherent to any other business venture.’49 Warnings like these should 
at least serve to alert a prospective franchisee’s transactional advisers to the possibility of franchisor 
failure. This is, however, predicated on three flawed assumptions. Firstly, transactional advisers are 
seldom versed in the complexities of insolvency. Secondly, it is widely assumed that franchisors only 
sell businesses that are proven. In fact, in Australia, ‘42 percent of brands began franchising 
immediately or within the first year of operation.’50 Finally, it is assumed that franchisees are business 
people who should conduct proper due diligence, take professional advice, negotiate better contracts 
                                                     
48 Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulation 2014, Schedule 1 Franchising Code of Conduct, Annexure 2, 
Information statement for prospective franchisee Information statement for prospective franchisees. 
49 Franchise Council of Australia, ‘Buying a Franchise: Guidelines’ <http://www.franchise.org.au/buying-a-franchise.html>. 
50 Lorelle Frazer, S Weaven, Anthony Grace, & S Selvanathan, ‘Franchising Australia 2016’ (Griffith University 2016) 20. 
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and that, having decided to buy a franchise, must cope with their decision. Franchisees generally do 
conduct better due diligence than buyers of independent small businesses,51 but not all do so. The ability 
to conduct thorough due diligence is hampered by an absence of information on public databases, which 
in Australia is exacerbated because a master franchisee, such as the 7-Eleven master franchisee for 
Australia, may be one of the 1500 ‘Exempt Proprietary Companies’ exempt under the Corporations Act 
from annual filings in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.52  This makes conducting 
due diligence on that company’s finances impossible. In addition, excessive cost, franchisees’ optimism 
bias,53 dependence asymmetry,54 and, recalling Hashim’s comments, the franchisee being ‘clueless’, 
mean that new franchisees don’t know what they don’t know. 
Novice franchisees behave more like first time consumers. Even ‘carefully crafted [legal or 
accounting] advice does not help when the blood lust is up’, as noted in a letter from then franchise 
lawyer Philip Linacre to [one of the authors] in October 2016. Being psychologically and emotionally 
committed to becoming a franchisee, the client does not hear advice to the contrary. As Alan Wein 
noted, ‘an aspiring franchisee's desire to ‘buy a job’ clouds the willingness to analyse objectively the 
commercial terms and risks or to make sure that expectations match the contractual reality.’55 This 
mirrors the lack of choice that employees have in accepting employment; there really is no choice if 
there is only one job on offer.  
In the UK, there are no franchise-specific regulations, though the British Franchise Association 
(BFA) has adopted the European Code of Ethics in its BFA Code. The BFA Code only provides 
guidance on its requirements for compliance and omits warnings of the risks of franchising. It requires 
a prospective franchisor to pilot the concept before starting to franchise, provides requirements as to 
the return of preliminary deposits, requires recruitment advertising to be free of ambiguity, and requires 
                                                     
51 Jenny Buchan, L Fraser, Scott Weaven, Binh Tran-Nam, and Anthony Grace, ‘The Effectiveness of Undertaking Due Diligence Prior to 
Starting Up or Purchasing a Small Business or Franchise’ (Report for CPA Australia). 
52 Ben Butler, ‘Behind closed doors: an exclusive club is determined to stay private. A clause allowing companies to keep accounts secret 
looks set to stay’, The Sydney Morning Herald 21 July 2012. 
53 U Benoliel, Jenny Buchan, and T Gutentag, ‘Revisiting the Rationality Assumption of Disclosure Laws: an Empirical Analysis’(2016) 46(2) 
Hofstra Law Review 469. 
54 James R Brown, Robert F Lusch, and Carolyn Y Nicholson, ‘Power and Relationship Commitment: their Impact on Marketing Channel 
Member Performance’ (1995) 71(4) Journal of Retailing 363. 
55 Alan Wein, ‘Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct’ (Report to The Hon Gary Gray AO MP, Minister for Small Business and The 
Hon Bernie Ripoll MP, Parliamentary Secretary for Small Business, Commonwealth of Australia). 
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parties to be fair towards each other.56 The Code is non-binding, and there is no clear sanction for a 
breach.57 This does not mitigate the risks undertaken by franchisees entering into a franchise agreement.  
In the US, the FTC Rule mandates comprehensive disclosure in the form of the Uniform 
Franchise Offering Circular that all franchisors must adhere to, but this does not provide the franchisees 
with standing in their franchisor’s bankruptcy. In addition, many US states have enacted franchise-
specific regulation. The US based International Franchise Association (IFA) Code of Ethics requires 
mutual respect among franchisees and franchisors, compliance with the law and appropriate conflict 
resolution in its Mission Statement. As in the UK, the IFA Code is non-binding and there are no required 
pre-agreement warnings about asymmetries of information or the risk of failure.58 Thus, UK and US 
franchisees have similar risks to their Australian counterparts.  
Franchisors have continued to advertise for franchisees while insolvent,59 despite, in Australia, 
issuing the required pre-contract disclosure containing the solvency statement.60 According to a survey 
conducted in 2014, among a sample of eight Australian administrators who had administered failing 
franchisors, ‘three of the eight said there was evidence that this behaviour was present in the franchises 
they were administering.’61 When all other sources of debt finance have dried up or become 
prohibitively expensive, the opportunity to inject a franchise fee, which ranged from $0 to $150,000 in 
Australia in 201662 into its revenue can prove irresistible to a failing franchisor. 
                                                     
56 British Franchise Association: European Code of Ethics for Franchising <http://www.thebfa.org/Content/FileManager/2016-european-code-
of-ethics-and-bfa-extension-and-interpretation.pdf>. 
57 Chris Wormald, ‘Franchising in the UK (England and Wales): Overview’ (Thompson Reuters Practical Law 2016) 
<https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com> notes that the sanction for non-compliance by a member is exclusion from the BFA. 
58 International Franchising Association Mission Statement/Vision/Code of Ethics <http://www.franchise.org/mission-statementvisioncode-
of-ethics>. 
59 For example, The administrator of former Australian franchisor Beach House Group Pty Ltd wrote under the heading Insolvent Trading 
“… there are sufficient grounds to suspect that the company was insolvent from at least February 2008. … There is also evidence to suggest 
that the company was likely insolvent prior to February 2008. In particular, statutory debts owed to the Australian Taxation Office [statutory 
demands totalling $1,409,785] relates [sic] to debts incurred as far back as 2005 and 2006”. Bruno A Secatore, Cor Cordis, Beach House 
Group Pty ltd (Administrators Appointed) ACN 098 577 667 Administrators Report 16 December 2008, 14. The authors have on file evidence 
of one franchise agreement entered by Beach House Group on 22 September 2006.  
60 Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulation 2014. Clause 21.1 A statement of the franchisor’s solvency that: 
           (a) reflects the franchisor’s position: 
               (i) at the end of the last financial year; or 
               (ii) if the franchisor did not exist at the end of the last financial year—at the date of the statement; and 
           (b) is signed by at least one director of the franchisor; and 
           (c) gives the directors’ opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the franchisor will be able to pay its debts as 
and when they fall due. 
61 Jenny Buchan et al, ‘Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles, Factors, and Impacts’ (2015) 22(4) J Marketing Channels 311, 323. The 
same conduct by different franchisors was reported in Jenny Buchan, ‘Franchising: A Honey Pot in a Bear Trap’ (2014) 34 Adelaide Law 
Review 283, 312.  
62 Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven, Anthony Grace, & Selva Selvanathan, ‘Franchising Australia 2016’ (Griffith University 2016) 37. 
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As franchisors expand their operations beyond their own borders they introduce intermediaries: 
master franchisees who are responsible for populating a specific territory with franchisees. Franchisees 
in that territory contract with the master franchisee who, in turn, contracts with the franchisor. At each 
level of the franchise system there is a multiplier effect. A franchisor may, for instance, appoint 10 
master franchisees in distinct territories. Each of these in turn signs franchise agreements with numerous 
unit or multi-unit franchisees who establish businesses following the franchisor’s blueprint. ‘The 
interrelated nature of the franchisor and franchisee’s businesses together with the pattern of contractual 
relationships that bind the franchise network are strengths that become weaknesses for franchisees if a 
franchisor fails.’63 While the franchise agreement will be the main focus of the insolvency practitioners 
there are other contracts that franchisees must execute so they can operate their businesses. These may 
include, for example; leases, sub-leases, licences, guarantees, supplier agreements, loan agreements and 
contracts with employees.  The franchisee will remain bound to perform these contracts even after the 
franchise agreement, itself is disclaimed by the franchisor’s liquidator. The failure of one franchisor has 
a domino effect through to the franchisee-owned businesses. To their further disadvantage, unit 
franchisees have no privity of contract with the franchisor if there is a master franchisee between them, 
leaving them without rights as unsecured creditors in the franchisor’s insolvency.  
Most franchisors, master franchisees, and franchisees need to borrow money to establish their 
business. In Australia in 2016, unit franchisees’ ‘start-up costs ranged from $2,500 to more than $1.225 
million.’64 Much of this investment is in sunk costs as shown in Table 1.  
1: Item paid by 
franchisee 
2: 
Franchisee’s 
investment  
3: Relevant 
contract 
4: Franchisee 
paid to … 
5: Outcome for franchisee in 
insolvency of franchisor 
Franchise fee 
paid to secure 
rights for 5 
years 
$50,000  
 
Franchise 
agreement 
between 
franchisee and 
franchisor signed 
Franchisor in 
full before 
commence 
business 
Franchisee no statutory right to 
claim from administrator. 
Franchisee will be a creditor for 
an amount in damages for 
breach of the franchise 
agreement. The franchisee may 
seek leave to bring proceedings 
against the insolvent franchisor 
to quantify its claim65 
                                                     
63 Jenny Buchan et al, ‘Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles, Factors, and Impacts’ (2015) 22(4) Journal of Marketing Channels 311, 
318. 
64 Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven, Anthony Grace, & Selva Selvanathan, ‘Franchising Australia 2016’ (Griffith University 2016) 37. 
65 In Cheque One Pty Ltd v Cheque Exchange (Australia) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2002] FCA 593, 12 applicant franchisees sought leave of 
the court under s 471B Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to join proceedings commenced against the franchisor in 2000. 
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1: Item paid by 
franchisee 
2: 
Franchisee’s 
investment  
3: Relevant 
contract 
4: Franchisee 
paid to … 
5: Outcome for franchisee in 
insolvency of franchisor 
Sunk fit out 
costs 
$550,000 - 
$750,000 
Disclosure 
document 
Franchisor for 
payment on to 
independent 
shop fitter 
Lease (in franchisor's name) 
disclaimed by administrator. 
Landlord would negotiate with 
franchisee for a continued 
tenancy agreement if franchisee 
gave up value of fit out. Lost 
sunk cost of fit out and portion 
of other costs. 
Other fit out 
costs (eg: 
design, point of 
sale systems) 
$260,000 - 
$425,000 
Disclosure 
document 
Franchisor or 
supplier 
Lease (in franchisor's name) 
disclaimed by administrator. 
Landlord would negotiate with 
franchisee for a continued 
tenancy agreement if franchisee 
gave up value of fit out. Lost 
portion of other costs. 
Franchisor's fit 
out supervision 
Est. $50,000 - 
$80,000 
Franchise 
agreement 
between 
franchisee and 
franchisor 
Franchisor as a 
stated fee on top 
of invoiced fit 
out cost 
Service fully performed by 
franchisor; franchisee no right 
to claim.  
Inventory/ stock $45,000  As specified by 
franchisor in 
Operations 
Manual 
Franchisor or 
supplier 
Return, sell, depends on terms 
of supply 
Security deposit 
on franchisor's 
head lease 
Bank 
guarantee – 
est. $45,000 - 
$60,000 
Franchise 
agreement 
between 
franchisee and 
franchisor 
Provided direct 
to landlord 
In some jurisdictions franchisee 
sub-tenant can negotiate with 
landlord if head tenant 
(franchisor) insolvent 
Monthly 
premises rental 
and outgoings 
$12,000 - 
$13,000 
Lease between 
franchisor and 
landlord. 
sublease/ licence 
between 
franchisor and 
franchisee 
Franchisor for 
forwarding to 
landlord. 
Franchisee debtor of franchisor. 
Franchisor in breach of lease 
because of appointment of 
administrator 
Training costs $20,000 Franchise 
agreement 
between 
franchisee and 
franchisor 
To general 
revenue of 
franchisor or 
franchisor 
related company 
on day paid 
Franchisee not creditor or 
debtor. No claim possible 
Store opening 
campaign 
$10,000 - 
$15,000 
Franchise 
agreement 
between 
franchisee and 
franchisor 
Paid to 
franchisor up 
front 
Franchisee not creditor or 
debtor. No claim possible 
Facility, 
telephone, 
electricity 
Est. $5,000 - 
$10,000 
Franchise 
Agreement 
Supplier Franchisee not creditor or 
debtor. No claim possible 
Legal & 
accounting 
costs 
Est. $10,000 - 
$20,000  
Franchise 
Agreement and 
Code 
Supplier Franchisee not creditor or 
debtor. No claim possible 
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1: Item paid by 
franchisee 
2: 
Franchisee’s 
investment  
3: Relevant 
contract 
4: Franchisee 
paid to … 
5: Outcome for franchisee in 
insolvency of franchisor 
Options to open 
future 
franchisee 
owned stores @ 
$20,000 per 
option 
$60,000 Agreement 
between 
franchisor and 
franchisee 
Paid to 
franchisor up 
front 
No statute-based claim possible. 
Franchisee not a creditor for 
$60,000 unless could claim 
breach of contract/quasi-
contract at common law. 
Requires court consent to 
initiate civil proceedings. These 
normally prevented under ss 
440D or 471B Corporations Act 
2001 in Australia 
Table 1:66 Actual costs of an Australian franchisee buying into system in 2016, and outcome for those funds in 
franchisor’s insolvency.  
Table 1 shows the sums involved in establishing one retail franchise in Australia in 2016, and 
the participation available to the franchisee in the franchisor’s administration. The borrowed amounts 
are secured over the franchisee’s assets, including its director’s home. Franchisees also provide personal 
guarantees for the head lease of their premises, which is often granted to the franchisor/master 
franchisee.  
In contrast to the cost of the failing franchisor’s employees, its franchisees and their employees 
are a costless source of labour for franchisors’ administrators. Administrators can choose which 
contracts to retain or terminate during an administration in most jurisdictions. If an administrator retains 
franchise agreements, franchisees will be required to continue operations despite a franchisor’s 
insolvency as they remain contractually bound to perform under the franchise agreements, unless 
otherwise provided for in the agreement. Because the costs of running a franchise, including wages, 
superannuation, insurances, and other allowances and benefits, fall on the franchisee, the administrator 
incurs no additional cost to the franchisor in administration if it continues the franchise agreements and 
there is no urgency to prioritise the resolution of any issues relating to them. Thus, administrators can 
benefit from the profit sharing aspect of the franchise agreements without incurring any of the business 
costs of the franchise operations.  
                                                     
66 Table from Jenny Buchan ‘Franchisor failure: An Assessment of the Adequacy of Regulatory Response’ (PhD dissertation, Queensland 
University of Technology 2010) 61-64, and updated with 2016 data. Items in Columns 1, 3 and 4 were supplied to one of the authors by a 
former franchisee of the failed franchisor, Danoz Directions Pty Ltd.  
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Unlike employees, who are entitled to be represented in Committees of Creditors, franchisees 
may not be creditors of the franchisor; most are debtors.67  Some administrators put franchisees into 
creditors’ committees ‘for a dollar’, acknowledging that they do have an interest in the outcome of the 
administration. However, there is no requirement to do so. There is no clear mechanism for ensuring 
that franchisees are informed or consulted, as evidenced in a 2014 survey of administrators of Australian 
franchisor firms.68 By contrast, employees of all three jurisdictions enjoy some form of regulatory 
protection and/or participation rights when jobs are at risk.  
Franchisees in Franchisor Insolvency  
As is now clear, ‘[t]he law does not accommodate the franchisees’ interests in a neat or predictable way 
if its counterparty’s business fails.’69 For them, the loss of a franchise can represent the loss of not only 
a large, sunk investment, but also their family's sole source of income70 possibly leading to financial 
ruin.71 While true that franchisees have a choice and are required to engage in dude diligence, their 
business experience, or lack thereof, may result in unwise choices influenced by their hopes for success 
and related optimism bias. Franchisor insolvency may also lead to the loss of franchisees’ employees’ 
jobs indicating additional social costs. Where a franchisor is the supplier of goods sold by its 
franchisees, the loss quickly compounds as set-off against money owed to the franchisor is not available. 
Franchisee debts must be paid in full, while their credits in franchisor insolvency are unsecured.72  
The bulk of franchisor’s assets are intangible,73 consisting of intellectual property74 and use 
licences, head leases75 and franchise agreements. As Mark A Kirsch and Lee J Plave note, ‘[f]or many 
franchise systems, the vast majority (or sometimes all) of the brand outlets are … owned and operated 
                                                     
67 Jenny Buchan et al, ‘Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles, Factors, and Impacts’ (2015) 22(4) Journal of Marketing Channels 311, 
324. 
68 Jenny Buchan et al, ‘Franchisor Insolvency in Australia: Profiles, Factors, and Impacts’ (2015) 22(4) Journal of Marketing Channels 311, 
322-324. 
69 Jenny Buchan, ‘Deconstructing the Franchise as a Legal Entity’ (2014) 21(3) Journal of Marketing Channels 143, 153. 
70 Jennifer Dolman, Geoffrey Grove, David Sterns, and Stuart Freen, ‘Unique Circumstances in Litigating Franchise Class  
Actions’ (Proceedings of Canadian Institute's 12th Annual National Forum on Class Actions Litigation, Toronto, Canada 2011). 
71 Steven H Goldman, ‘Tackling Troublesome Insolvency Issues for Franchisees’ (2003) <http://www.goldmanhine.com/steven-goldman/>. 
72 Jason Gherke, ‘Sizzler on Life Support as Stores Shut’ (Franchise Advisory Centre newsletter) 
<http://www.news.com.au/finance/business/retail/sizzler-on-life-support-as-stores-shut/news-story/754dfaa661aa32479cbe2396dcd9909c> 
accessed 26 March 2018. 
73 Bruce E Schaeffer and Susan J Robins, ‘Valuation of Intangible Assets in Franchise Companies and Multinational Groups: a Current Issue’ 
(2008) 27(3) Franchise Law Journal 185. 
74 Jenny Buchan, ‘Franchisors’ Registered Trademarks – Empirical Surprises’ (2009) 21(7) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 154. 
75 Jenny Buchan and Bill Butcher, ‘Premises Occupancy Models for Franchised Retail Businesses in Australia: Factors for Consideration’ 
(2009) 17(2) Australian Property Law Journal 143. 
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by independent franchisees. … Consequently, the franchise relationships - contractually ratified by the 
franchise agreements – are usually the most critical assets owned by a franchisor.’76  
Franchisors are in a strong position to monitor the financial viability of their franchisees’ 
businesses by being head lessee of the franchisee’s premises, possibly suppliers of stock, and receiving 
electronic point of sale reports of franchisees’ takings. This puts the franchisor into a position where 
they can identify the risk of a franchisee’s financial difficulty early. Their response, to avoid an 
insolvency procedure, can be to allege the franchisee has committed a breach of the franchise agreement 
by defaulting on a debt obligation. If the franchisee is unable to remedy the breach, the franchisor 
terminates the franchise agreement. This deprives the franchisee’s creditors of the opportunity to 
recover debts through their own insolvency procedure with the franchisee. Franchisees do not have the 
same access to financial information about their franchisors’ ongoing finances.  Rather, ‘[t]he financial 
difficulties of a … franchisor may become apparent only when the franchisor’s obligation to provide 
advertising support, equipment and inventory on a timely basis … are breached.’77  
The foregoing demonstrates that franchisors have access to a wealth of information on their 
franchisees so that they can monitor and control how their business and brand are being used. 
Franchisees, however, have very little access to information about the franchisor’s business and 
finances that could help them to come to decisions in their financial best interest. This information 
asymmetry, acute in a franchisor’s insolvency, is a clear disruption in the competitive franchise market, 
justifying some form of interference in order to mitigate the unfairness present in the marketplace.78 
The following sections discuss what, if any, protections are present for franchisees in the United States, 
Australia and the United Kingdom if its franchisor becomes insolvent in order to determine whether 
further regulation is needed to introduce fairness in the franchise relationship.  
                                                     
76 A M Meiklejohn (ed.), Franchising: Cases, Materials and Problems (American Bar Association 2013) 716. 
77 Craig R Colraine, ‘Franchises: Insolvency and Restructuring’ (Distribution Law: Catch the Wave, Avoid the Rocks, Ontario Bar 
Association Continuing Legal Education, Toronto, Canada 2003). 
78 Richard A Posner, ‘Theories of Market Regulation’ (1974) 5(2) Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 335. 
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Jurisdictional Comparisons of Franchisor Insolvency 
The United States 
Strategic insolvency ‘arises where the bankruptcy is invoked due to strategic decision-making rather 
than being a passive response to market forces.’79 This may be appealing to a franchisor to achieve any 
one of several possible objectives. US franchise lawyers note that ‘Bankruptcy … may assist a 
franchisor in addressing challenging business issues, such as overexpansion in the market and the need 
to eliminate units, an unworkable equity structure; desire to sell or merge with another entity; threat of 
franchisee litigation; desire to refinance but the lender has expressed concern about financial or other 
issues.’80 Because franchise agreements are executory contracts, they cannot be terminated by reason 
of the filing for bankruptcy.81  
Franchisees do not enjoy automatic standing in franchisor bankruptcy.  Rather their degree of 
involvement remains at the discretion of the administrator. ‘[S]ome … administrators convene 
committees of franchisees. This creates a two-way information conduit and enables the administrators 
to gauge whether, perhaps, a group of franchisees is interested in buying the franchisor’s business.’82  
Australia  
Challenges confronting Australian franchisees of failing franchisors arise from uncertainty over 
ongoing rights to use brands and premises; risk of court-sanctioned extended periods of administration; 
lack of access to creditors’ meetings; refusal of administrators to mediate disputes;  having to continue 
trading because there is no ipso facto clause enabling franchisees to terminate their agreement in the 
event of insolvency;83 inability to prosecute as the Corporations Act (‘CA’) provides for a stay on 
proceedings by third parties during administration; and loss of customers who do not want to trade with 
a business they perceive (by brand association) is failing.  
                                                     
79 Peta Spender, ‘Scenes from a Wharf: Containing the Morality of the Corporate Law’ (Proceedings of the 9th Annual Corporate Law 
Teachers Association Conference. Monash University, Melbourne, Australia 1999) 21-29. 
80 Sarah B Foster and Carolyn Johnsen, ‘The war of the worlds: Bankruptcy versus… (American Bar Association, 28th Annual Forum on 
Franchising, Florida 2005). 
81 US Code Title 11 Chapter 3 Subchapter IV § 365(e)(1).  
82 Jenny Buchan, ‘Franchising: A Honeypot in a Bear Trap’ (2014) 34 Adelaide Law Review 283, 314. 
83 Jenny Buchan and Rob Nicholls, ‘The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Effects of Voiding ipso facto Clauses in Business Format 
Franchise Agreements’ (2017) 45(5) Australian Business Law Review 433. 
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On the insolvency of the franchisor, franchisees may discover that their brand’s intellectual 
property is owned by another company.84  As a result, licence fees may be breached or present a liability 
that the administrator may not decide to adopt, or choose to sell, potentially invalidating the franchisees’ 
IP licenses. Leases also ‘present [an] area of recurring uncertainty’85 to administrators to whom a five-
day grace period is granted to deal with such leases.86 An insolvent franchisor will likely default on the 
head leases of franchisee trading premises, causing its franchisees to forfeit their rental deposits, losing 
the right to trade from their premises.   
Normally the second creditors’ meeting (at which the administrators make a final report with 
recommendations to creditors) must be held within 21 days of the appointment of the administrator. 
However, the court has discretion to consent to this meeting being held later. In the REDgroup Case, 
the administrators appointed on 17 February 2011 were granted additional time to hold the second 
meeting of creditors. On 14 March 2011, Justice Stone ordered, ‘[p]ursuant to s439A (6) of the 
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) (Act), ... the period within which the Administrators of the second plaintiffs 
must convene meetings of creditors of REDGroup Retail Pty Ltd and each other company names in the 
Schedule under s439A of the Act [is] extended up to and including 18 September 2011.’ 87  This enabled 
the administrators to identify and negotiate with potential buyers of parts of the business. The extended 
time frame placed the franchisees in limbo for 213 days from the administrator’s appointment to the 
second creditors’ meeting, 192 days (nearly 28 weeks) longer than the usual statutory period. This 
timeframe underscores the complexity of franchisor administration and emphasises the franchisees’ 
vulnerability  
Evidence shows that such extensions are common to maximise the administrator’s opportunity 
to sell the franchise as a going concern.88 A consequence of time extensions for franchisees who are not 
consulted, is that they must continue operating their business while dealing with less advantageous 
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supplier terms because they are now being supplied direct without the prior benefit of franchisor-
negotiated bulk discounts and juggling the instructions of the administrators hoping that they will be 
able to remain in business.  
A franchisee is not a creditor for the sunk portion of its investment (See Table 1) unless they 
can claim in equity against the franchisor or liquidator for unjust enrichment. A prerequisite to any such 
action would be obtaining a court’s consent to the civil proceedings being initiated against the insolvent 
party.89  
For agreements that fall within the ambit of the Code, franchisors, but not franchisees are 
provided with what amounts to a statute-sanctioned ipso facto clause. This enables a franchisor to 
terminate a franchise agreement if the franchisee becomes bankrupt, insolvent under administration or 
an externally-administered body corporate.90 This puts the Code in conflict with the CA and is an 
example of the disconnect between consumer protection law and corporate law, and their respective 
regulators: the ACCC and ASIC in Australia.91 This right to terminate is not extended to franchisees. 
This is an example of legislation that purports to level the playing field, tipping it even further in favour 
of the stronger party.  
The United Kingdom/EU 
Administration does not automatically terminate franchise contracts in the UK either. However, when 
the administrator chooses to continue the business, any expenses accruing under existing contracts will 
be counted as an expense of the administration.92 Often, franchise agreements will be the franchisor’s 
only valuable asset. An administrator will logically adopt them, intending to sell them to swell the pool 
of funds for distribution 
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In a 2007 survey of members of the International Bar Association’s committees on restructuring 
and franchising, participants were asked how franchisees could potentially be categorised in their 
franchisor’s insolvency. Responses from Belgium were ‘as a creditor or a debtor’; Denmark, as an asset, 
creditor, debtor, franchisee or other’, England as a creditor or debtor; Finland, as a creditor, debtor or 
franchisee; France as ‘other’; Germany as a liability, creditor, debtor or franchisee; Greece as an asset, 
liability, creditor or debtor; Ireland as ‘did not know’; the Netherlands as a franchisee; and Spain as a 
creditor.93  Only three of the jurisdictions surveyed Canada, Syria and Vietnam) recognised franchisees 
as a stakeholder in the franchisor’s insolvency.94 The range of responses suggests there is no settled 
approach to the categorisation of franchisees in this situation. 
JUSTIFYING FRANCHISEE PARTICIPATION IN FRANCHISE DECISION-MAKING  
In most jurisdictions, the employment relationship can be characterised by the subordination of an 
employee to the needs of the employer, who will generally have control over hours, work place, tools, 
and work performance. An inherent imbalance in employment relationships has historically allowed for 
the exploitation of employees,95 and the intentional framing of some employees as franchisees in the 
US,96 or as independent contractors in Australia.97 Employment law today equalises the bargaining 
power in employment relationships through legislation, preventing employers from unfairly exercising 
their power over employees and protecting employees’ right to continued employment. As indicated, 
no such mitigation of franchise relationship inequities as yet exists, despite the clear moral hazard 
present in the business model.  
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Justifying Employee Protection in Insolvency 
The argument for protecting employees with some priority in insolvency stems from various 
justifications. In the US, the purpose of Chapter 11 as a reorganisation procedure indicates the hope that 
the business will continue. Also, an employee’s wages represent a large part of that person’s wealth; 
they do not enter the relationship consciously factoring in the risk of their employer’s default like a 
trade creditor negotiating a contract might. Prioritising employee claims may prevent valuable 
employees from seeking work elsewhere, and taking corporate knowledge with them, while a 
reorganisation is taking place.98 In Australia it has been suggested that ‘employees enjoy a priority 
predominantly because they are involuntary creditors.’99 Franchisees could arguably claim priority on 
the same basis. 
Historically, it has been argued that social policy and regulations are an illegitimate interference 
with market relations.100 While freedom, autonomy, liberty, and individualism are central to the needs 
of free market capitalism and a growing commercial economy,101 these positive characteristics are not 
always accessible. It is an inaccurate reflection of the real position of employees in the labour market, 
and by analogy, franchisees. If markets are truly competitive, information must be perfect to reach a 
true competitive equilibrium. This presumes that government intervention should not be necessary to 
maintain market efficiency in an optimal competitive situation.102 However, the labour and by extension 
the franchisee market is imperfectly competitive due to inequality of bargaining power, unequal access 
to information and resources, and unequal rights, as demonstrated.  
While employment law often impedes the perceived efficiency of the free market, it is justified 
as restoring balance to an otherwise potentially exploitative and imbalanced relationship that, without 
control, would be socially inefficient and unjust due to unilateral reduction employment rights.103 
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Market failures owing to informational problems that cause an inefficient allocation of resources 
provide a premise for the argument in favour of social policy as a factor for improving that market 
efficiency.104 It is only necessary to observe the exploitation of workers that does occur in developing 
countries to realise that such conditions persist.105 Franchisees are easy contemporary subjects for 
similar manipulation. 
Over the last few decades, information, consultation, and participation requirements have been 
introduced when collective redundancies are envisaged. This is particularly relevant for our discussion 
about how the franchisee should be considered. Most employment law regimes, apart from the US, 
imply a term of ‘mutual trust and confidence’ or ‘good faith’ through either statute or common law into 
the employment relationship. Any breach can have legal consequences, which is one of several factors 
that differentiates employees from franchisees. Nevertheless, employees and franchisees have much in 
common. 
Justifying Franchisee Participation: Moral Hazard 
There are several reasons why a business owner may choose to franchise, many of which relate 
to reducing their financial risks. When a business owner is required to hire more employees, increasing 
employee liabilities, franchising presents an opportunity to defray those costs and increase profitability 
by outsourcing employees to franchisees.106 Further, maintaining a centrally organised company with 
several units separated geographically can be costly for developing effective means of controlling 
employees and managers.107  
Other factors that favour franchising include low initial investment costs and more repeat 
customers. 108 Finally, the franchise contract itself is habitually drafted in favour of the franchisor with 
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a view to increasing profit and control,109 often at the franchisee’s expense. Given the foregoing, one 
thing is clear: franchisors, whether intentionally or not, mitigate their personal business risks by 
substituting franchisees as risk bearers. Passing risk freely in this way presents a moral hazard that, 
during a franchisor’s insolvency, becomes all the more severe.  There are many aspects of the franchise 
relationship and characteristics of franchisees that demonstrates this moral hazard. 
Decentralisation  
Franchisors are highly decentralised organisations whose degree of decentralisation comes into 
sharp focus during insolvency. The franchise network is designed to divide the globe into territories 
allocated to master franchisees and unit franchisees. Geographically dispersed franchisees may have no 
way to contact each other outside franchisor-controlled channels. The risks associated with their 
franchisor’s insolvency crystallise for franchisees when the administrator is appointed. The situation 
takes them by surprise. A franchisee that does not know that, for example, having to pay cash on 
delivery for supplies can indicate their franchisor has not been paying suppliers, will not be alert to 
signs of impending insolvency.110 Similarly, if the head lease of the franchisee’s trading premises is 
held by the franchisor, and the franchisee has paid its rent and outgoings on time, it will not know the 
franchisor has failed to pass those sums to the landlord until the landlord issues an eviction notice.  
Franchisees cannot protect themselves ex ante through their standard form franchise 
agreements, nor through legislated protection. Legislation enacted to provide protection to franchisees 
operates largely as a form of pre-commitment information delivery. Some jurisdictions mandate 
registration on a government database of the franchise disclosure document, and/or franchise advisers 
is required. Notably absent are statutory or contractual rights for franchisees if their franchisor enters 
the insolvency process.   They are like the Cheshire Cat – visible and essential when all is going well, 
then fading as the administration proceeds.111 
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Optimism bias 
There is growing evidence that people tends to be stubbornly optimistic, regardless of how well 
informed they are. Most are overconfident about the future, even when they understand the risks.112 
This is the ‘optimism bias’ referred to previously and which is one justification for introducing 
protection in the form of information and consultation for franchisees to mitigate the moral hazard 
presented by the franchise model. Although franchisees are given due diligence information, processing 
such information is replete with subjective problems. It can be difficult to respond to the information 
as people depend on their own experiences to judge information. These perceptions, and judgments 
based on them, may often exhibit overconfidence if a particularly positive outcome is possible,113 such 
as, in franchising, the pervasive mantra of a successful franchisor.  Optimism bias considers the illogical 
perceptions that individuals may have of themselves when undertaking certain risks, in this case, the 
risk of becoming a franchisee.  
The extent to which warning franchisees about the risks associated with franchising will affect 
how rational their decisions are is questionable. Over-optimism is derived from a tendency to reject or 
downplay information that contradicts more favourable information.114 Research on franchisees in the 
US has shown that they are strongly optimistically biased in relation to known potentially damaging 
risks to their business.115 Thus, it is arguable that franchisees are more likely to be positively influenced 
by the promise of success and profit, than by the intangible and perhaps intellectually inaccessible risks 
associated with engaging in the business model. Individuals prefer to believe that they are intelligent 
enough not to subject themselves to substantial risk.116 Thus, optimism bias, combined with 
asymmetries in information and bargaining power in the franchise relationship, the size and nature of 
the franchisees’ investment, the absence of franchisors duties beyond the contract, and the likelihood 
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that franchisees are geographically remote from the franchisor, leave them more vulnerable than 
employees and present a clear moral hazard. As that relationship matures and the spectre of insolvency 
or restructuring that excludes them looms, franchisees may find themselves without enough information 
or access to suitable advisers to mitigate their risks. 
A fairness argument 
While there is an imbalance in the relationship between franchisors and franchisees, whether 
there is also a macroeconomic argument for providing protection is untested. The ‘change in the way 
employing organisations work’117 in the 21st century by shifting employees off their payroll and turning 
some of them into franchisees should not free creditors of these organisations, or policy makers, from 
allowing franchisees a seat at the table and a clear set of rights if the franchisor becomes insolvent. 
Franchisees are not nearly as numerous in the entire labour market as employees but do form a sizeable 
proportion of the work force in some sectors.  
Franchisors’ strategic decisions may be to invest rashly, embark on distracting and expensive 
litigation, expand into unprofitable new markets or countries, or even become insolvent. If insolvency 
results, the franchisor’s employees are protected by priorities in law, and through union representation, 
but franchisees are not; nor are their employees except insofar as national regulations provide. 
Franchisees are currently subject to the whim of the administrator and the market. If their businesses 
are unable to continue they probably also lose premises fit-out, rental deposits, and lay their own staff 
off. It may be that the best argument in favour of additional protections would be a socially orientated 
one from the perspective of the franchisee as the weaker party in the franchise relationship.  The 
question, then, is what model such protections should take. We suggest that some form of consultative 
rights may be adequate to provide an advanced warning mechanism, allowing franchisees time and 
information to operate collectively to mitigate their individual franchise risks.  
It is acknowledged that such change is difficult to implement due to the path dependent nature 
of the institutional rules that have developed in the franchise model. However, as the laissez-faire path 
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in the labour market has been well and truly broken by most jurisdictions, it is not too farfetched to 
suggest that a similar, if less onerous, protective framework be introduced to mitigate against the moral 
hazard we have demonstrated is present in the franchise relationship, particularly on the eve of 
insolvency.  
OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To identify whether some participative procedure may be appropriate for franchisees, it is worthwhile 
examining what parallel procedures exist for employees who are subject to insolvency procedures in 
the jurisdictions under study. We may then borrow some elements from these procedures to create a 
participative framework for franchisees affected by the insolvency procedures of their franchisors.  
There are limited participative procedures available to American employees, largely due to 
adherence to the employment ‘at-will’ doctrine. The only alleviation is the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act (‘WARN Act’), passed to mitigate social issues surrounding large scale 
bankruptcies. The WARN Act does not require consultation, merely 60 days’ notice by employers 
having over 100 employees. It applies to plant closures resulting in 50 or more dismissals and mass lay-
offs of 500 or more employees or 33% of the workforce at a single site. Realistically, the US does not 
provide participative procedures in the event of an employers’ insolvency outside what is provided in 
collective agreements. These vary from employer to employer, and lack consistent application. 
In Australia, the Fair Work Act 2014 (Cth) (FWA) provides employee participative procedures. 
In collective redundancies, employers must consult with employees and their representatives if 15 or 
more dismissals are proposed for economic, technical, or structural reasons. An employer must notify 
each registered employee association that could represent associated members of proposals and reasons 
for dismissals; the number of affected employees; and the period over which dismissals should occur. 
Notice is to be given as soon as reasonably practicable after coming to the decision and before 
dismissal.118 It has been suggested in Australia that franchisees of franchisors in administration could 
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have the right to put the administrator on notice that if a suitable buyer is not found within a reasonable 
time, the franchisees should have the right to terminate their contracts.119 This would impose an 
obligation on administrators to seek a competent replacement for the franchisor, not just a source of 
cash for the franchisors’ creditors. 
In the UK, participative procedures for collective redundancies have developed through the 
implementation of the EU Collective Redundancy Directive (CRD).120 It mandates employee 
participation through consultation obligations. When the CRD applies, an employer must consult staff 
representatives. It specifies the points these consultations must cover, the information the employer 
must provide, and imposes procedural rules. While the implementation has varied across member states 
and led to some controversy within EU jurisprudence, the provisions present an interesting model for 
franchising. It requires that employees are consulted when such redundancies are contemplated121 and 
that such consultations should include how collective redundancies can be avoided and mitigating their 
consequences by considering other social measures, including redeployment and retraining.122 
Employers are required to provide employee representatives with relevant information and notify them 
in writing of the reasons, numbers, and period over which redundancies are envisaged to take place.123 
Of use for our purposes are the requirements of notification and consultation, which would allow 
franchisees to involve themselves in some decision-making within the franchise and enable them to 
mitigate the risks posed by the franchisor’s insolvency.  
There is currently no requirement for franchisees to be involved in their franchisor’s strategic 
decisions. Franchisees, however, would benefit from participation in the decisions that could impact on 
their livelihood. Some European jurisdictions, due to the make-up of their labour market and focus on 
collectivism and participation, offer far more participative opportunities to employees via works 
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councils, which may provide a valid model for a similar franchisee participation procedure triggered 
during major events. Given the above, we set out the following general recommendations:  
1. Oblige insolvency practitioners to keep franchisees informed; 
2. Require franchisors to inform franchisees if a decision may adversely impact the solvency of 
(a) the franchise network, (b) the individual franchisor, (c) the franchisee;  
3. Require that information about decisions that relate to (a) debt restructuring of the franchisor 
or any entity whose failure would adversely affect it, (b) organisational change or restructuring 
of the franchise or franchisor, and/or (c) the insolvency or imminent insolvency of the franchise 
or franchisor, be given to the franchisee no longer than 14 days after the decision is made;   
4. Provide that in any of the above situations the franchisee can require the franchisor (or the 
buyer) to buy back the franchisee’s unit(s) if the change results in the franchisee being 
materially disadvantaged; 
5. Adopt a variation of the EU ‘works council’ model and include franchisees in the board of any 
corporation that owns or operates a franchise network; 
6. Expand the corporate franchisor’s directors’ duties to oblige directors to owe to franchisees the 
same duties as they currently have to their company’s shareholders, employees, and creditors; 
7. Require that corporate governance includes a duty for directors to take decisions that factor in 
the well-being of the corporation’s franchisees;  
8. Remove Australia’s ‘Exempt Proprietary Company’ exemption under the Corporations Act 
from any company that is issuing franchise agreements; and 
9. Amend corporate law to give franchisees the right, during the administration period, to 
collective representation at committees of creditors. An issue to resolve would be whether to 
allocate them voting rights ‘for a dollar’ per franchisee, or for an amount that more nearly 
equated to the size of their investment.  
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10. Require franchisors to inform the state and/or private institution governing or regulating 
franchises,124 in advance, if a decision may adversely impact the solvency of (a) the franchise 
network, (b) the individual franchisor, (c) the franchisee, such information to be made publicly 
available to potential franchisees.  
CONCLUSION 
Franchisees are a large group of stakeholders who are simultaneously profoundly affected by and 
deprived of the opportunity to respond collectively to opportunities and threats franchisor insolvency 
presents. Legislated rights would mitigate the moral hazard these circumstances represent.  
‘The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest 
of its citizens: the power to coerce.’125 Observers have noted that the legislative process is skewed in 
favour of groups with lobbying power, usually special interest groups.126 The ability to lobby effectively 
to achieve a break in the institutional path of the franchise model requires numbers and cohesiveness, a 
characteristic lacking among the franchisees in all three jurisdictions.  
While it has been recognised that the power differential in the employment relationship needed 
balancing against the needs of business efficacy, franchisees have been left regulation-free in parallel 
circumstances. While true that franchisees have more choice than employees as to whether they want 
to take up a franchise, the same has been argued in the past about employees and continues to be argued 
in the US under the employment-at-will doctrine. Although current discourse on this topic adds that 
employment is a necessity that limits the choices that individuals can truly make in this regard, the fact 
remains that the argument is still in play in the largest Western economy. The FTC Rule in America 
requires franchisors to act fairly and seeks to facilitate informed decisions and prevent deception in the 
sale of franchises by requiring franchisors to provide prospective franchisees with essential information 
prior to the sale. Thus, there is also a justification for the introduction of some form of participative 
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obligations for franchisees as such already exists in some form. The existence of such a rule recognises 
that there is a risk of abuse. Given the problem of optimism bias in a franchisee’s perspective and that 
even balancing information asymmetries may not prevent franchisees from entering a poor deal, 
introducing information and consultation obligations in instances of financial distress or other structural 
decision making will help to mitigate the significant risks undertaken by franchisees. 
Before the franchise agreement is executed the market appears to be competitive but for 
numerous asymmetries that favour the franchisor including information failure and, in Australia, 
legislation that provides rights to franchisors in cases of franchisee failure, but not the reverse. Once 
the agreement has been executed the franchisee is committed to dealing with the franchisor who 
arguably becomes a monopolist.127 The forces of the competitive marketplace have failed franchisees.128  
Without the existence of franchisees, the solvent and failing franchisor would have had to provide a 
significant amount of the operational infrastructure, hire staff and ‘assume significant [additional] 
business risk.’129 To more accurately position franchisees, we recommend that they should have the 
right to participate in the franchisor’s insolvency as outlined above. This would not significantly 
complicate insolvency procedures occurring in decentralised corporate organisations but would be a 
positive incremental step towards providing a level of participative protection that is currently absent 
in franchise law. 
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